๋ณธ๋ฌธ ๋ฐ”๋กœ๊ฐ€๊ธฐ

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Malware Analysis Series (MAS) – Article 10 Alexandre Borges์˜ ๋ธ”๋กœ๊ทธ Exploit Reversing์—์„œ ํฌ์ŠคํŒ…๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ ๋ถ„์„ ์‹œ๋ฆฌ์ฆˆ 'Malware Analysis Series(MAS)'๋ฅผ ๋ฒˆ์—ญํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ณต๋ถ€ํ•ด๋ณด๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. MAS์˜ ๋งˆ์ง€๋ง‰ ์•„ํ‹ฐํด๋กœ Linux ๊ด€๋ จ ์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ ๋‚ด์šฉ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. [Introduction]์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ ๋ถ„์„ ์‹œ๋ฆฌ์ฆˆ(MAS)์˜ 10๋ฒˆ์งธ์ด์ž ๋งˆ์ง€๋ง‰ ์•„ํ‹ฐํด์— ์˜ค์‹  ๊ฒƒ์„ ํ™˜์˜ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฒˆ ๊ธ€์—์„œ๋Š” ELF ์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ ๋ฐ”์ด๋„ˆ๋ฆฌ ๋ถ„์„์— ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋˜๋Š” ๊ฐœ๋…, ๊ธฐ๋ฒ• ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์‹ค์ œ์ ์ธ ์ ˆ์ฐจ๋“ค์„ ํ•จ๊ป˜ ์‚ดํŽด๋ด…์‹œ๋‹ค.์ด ๊ธ€์€ ๋ฆฌ๋ˆ…์Šค ELF ๋ฐ”์ด๋„ˆ๋ฆฌ ๋ถ„์„์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ž…๋ฌธ ์ˆ˜์ค€์˜ ๋‚ด์šฉ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ถˆํ•„์š”ํ•œ ์„ธ๋ถ€์‚ฌํ•ญ์ด ์ฒ˜์Œ ์ ‘ํ•˜๋Š” ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์˜ ์ง€์‹ ํ˜•์„ฑ์— ๋ฐฉํ•ด๋˜์ง€ ์•Š๋„๋ก ์‹ ์ค‘ํ•˜๊ณ  ์ฒœ์ฒœํžˆ ์ง„ํ–‰ํ•˜๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ๊ธ€์˜ ์ฃผ๋œ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋Š” ์งง๊ณ  ๋‹จ์ˆœํ•˜๋ฉฐ ์œ ์ตํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์œ ์ง€ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ,.. 2025. 11. 27.
PE ๊ตฌ์กฐ ํŒŒ์‹ฑ (PE Structure Parsing) ์ด๋ฒˆ ๊ธ€์—์„œ๋Š” PE ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ฅผ ํŒŒ์‹ฑํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ์•Œ์•„๋ณด๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ํ”„๋กœ์„ธ์Šค ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ๋‹ด๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ตฌ์กฐ์ฒด์ธ PEB(Process Environment Block)๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ํ˜„์žฌ ๋กœ๋“œ๋œ ๋ชจ๋“ˆ(DLL)์˜ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ๊ฐ€์ ธ์˜ฌ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค._PEB ํ•„๋“œ Ldr์€ _PEB_LDR_DATA ๊ตฌ์กฐ์ฒด์˜ ํฌ์ธํ„ฐ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. _PEB_LDR_DATA ๊ตฌ์กฐ์ฒด๋Š” ํ˜„์žฌ ํ”„๋กœ์„ธ์Šค์—์„œ ๋กœ๋“œ๋œ ๋ชจ๋“ˆ๋“ค์˜ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ๋‹ด๊ณ  ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ๊ตฌ์กฐ์ฒด์—๋Š” _LIST_ENTRY ํƒ€์ž…์˜ ๋ฉค๋ฒ„(InLoadOrderModuleList, InMemoryOrderModuleList, InInitializationOrderModuleList)๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค._LIST_ENTRY ํƒ€์ž…์€ ์–‘๋ฐฉํ–ฅ ์—ฐ๊ฒฐ ๋ฆฌ์ŠคํŠธ๋กœ ๋‘ ํฌ์ธํ„ฐ Flink, Blink๋กœ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ๋˜์–ด ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ํฌ์ธํ„ฐ๋ฅผ ํ†ต.. 2025. 6. 11.
Malware Analysis Series (MAS) – Article 9 Alexandre Borges์˜ ๋ธ”๋กœ๊ทธ Exploit Reversing์˜ ์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ ๋ถ„์„ ์‹œ๋ฆฌ์ฆˆ 'Malware Analysis Series(MAS)'๋ฅผ ๋ฒˆ์—ญํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ณต๋ถ€ํ•ด๋ณด๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. MacOS/iOS ๋‚ด์šฉ์˜ ์•„ํ‹ฐํด 8์€ ์ž ์‹œ ๋ฏธ๋ค„๋‘๊ณ  9๋ฒˆ์งธ ์•„ํ‹ฐํด๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๊ณต๋ถ€ํ•ด๋ณด๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. [Introduction]์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ ๋ถ„์„ ์‹œ๋ฆฌ์ฆˆ(MAS)์˜ 9๋ฒˆ์งธ ์•„ํ‹ฐํด์— ์˜ค์‹  ๊ฒƒ์„ ํ™˜์˜ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฒˆ ์•„ํ‹ฐํด์—์„œ๋Š” ์œˆ๋„์šฐ ์‹คํ–‰ ํŒŒ์ผ๋กœ ๋Œ์•„์™€์„œ PE ํฌ๋งท๋ฟ๋งŒ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ์ผ๋ฐ˜์ ์ธ ์‰˜์ฝ”๋“œ(shellcode)๋ฅผ ๋‹ค๋ค„๋ณด๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.์š”์ฆ˜์€ Sliver, Brute Ratel, Havoc, Covenant, Empire, Cobalt Strike ๊ฐ™์€ ์ˆ˜์‹ญ ๊ฐ€์ง€์˜ C2 ํ”„๋ ˆ์ž„์›Œํฌ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. Cobalt Strike๋Š” ์‹ค์ œ red team operation์—.. 2025. 5. 2.
Malware Analysis Series (MAS) – Article 7 Alexandre Borges์˜ ๋ธ”๋กœ๊ทธ Exploit Reversing์˜ ์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ ๋ถ„์„ ์‹œ๋ฆฌ์ฆˆ 'Malware Analysis Series(MAS)'๋ฅผ ๋ฒˆ์—ญํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ณต๋ถ€ํ•ด๋ณด๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. MAS ์‹œ๋ฆฌ์ฆˆ์˜ 7๋ฒˆ์งธ ์•„ํ‹ฐํด์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. [Introduction]์•…์„ฑ PE ๋ฐ”์ด๋„ˆ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•  ๋•Œ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฐœ๋…, ๊ธฐ๋ฒ• ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์‹ค์งˆ์ ์ธ ์ ˆ์ฐจ๋“ค์„ ์ด๋ฒˆ 7๋ฒˆ์งธ ์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ ๋ถ„์„ ์‹œ๋ฆฌ์ฆˆ(MAS)์—์„œ ๊ณ„์†ํ•ด์„œ ์‚ดํŽด๋ณด๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.์ด๋ฒˆ์—๋Š” ์ตœ๊ทผ ๋ช‡ ๋…„๊ฐ„ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ ์ฐจ๋ก€ ์—…๋ฐ์ดํŠธ๋œ ๋ณต์žกํ•œ ๋ฑ…ํ‚น ํŠธ๋กœ์ด๋ชฉ๋งˆ์ธ Dridex๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ์™€ ๋งˆ์ฐฌ๊ฐ€์ง€๋กœ Dridex๋Š” ์ž๊ฒฉ์ฆ๋ช…(credental) ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ํƒˆ์ทจํ•˜๊ณ (kelogger ํ–‰์œ„), ์•”ํ˜ธํ™”๋œ C2 ์„œ๋ฒ„๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์ž์—๊ฒŒ ์ด๋ฅผ ์ „์†กํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์•…์„ฑ ๋ฌธ์„œ์— ์ฒจ๋ถ€๋œ ํŒŒ์ผ๋กœ ๋ฐฐํฌ๋˜์ง€๋งŒ,.. 2025. 4. 29.
Malware Analysis Series (MAS) – Article 6 Alexandre Borges์˜ ๋ธ”๋กœ๊ทธ Exploit Reversing์˜ ์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ ๋ถ„์„ ์‹œ๋ฆฌ์ฆˆ 'Malware Analysis Series(MAS)'๋ฅผ ๋ฒˆ์—ญํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ณต๋ถ€ํ•ด๋ณด๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. MAS ์‹œ๋ฆฌ์ฆˆ์˜ 6๋ฒˆ์งธ ์•„ํ‹ฐํด์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. [Instruction]6๋ฒˆ์งธ ์•„ํ‹ฐํด์—์„œ๋Š” ๊ณ„์†ํ•ด์„œ ์•…์„ฑ PE ๋ฐ”์ด๋„ˆ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•  ๋•Œ ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋˜๋Š” ๊ฐœ๋…, ๊ธฐ๋ฒ•, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์‹ค์งˆ์ ์ธ ์ ˆ์ฐจ๋“ค์„ ์‚ดํŽด๋ณด๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ง€๊ธˆ๊ป ๊ทธ๋žฌ๋˜ ๊ฒƒ์ฒ˜๋Ÿผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•  ๋ชจ๋“  ์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ ์ƒ˜ํ”Œ์€ Triage, Malware Bazaar, VirusTotal, Malshare, Polyswarm ๋“ฑ ์ž˜ ์•Œ๋ ค์ง„ ์ƒŒ๋“œ๋ฐ•์Šค ์„œ๋น„์Šค์—์„œ ๊ตฌํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ๊ธ€์—์„œ๋Š” ์•…์„ฑ์ฝ”๋“œ๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋˜๋Š” ์ ˆ์ฐจ๋“ค, ์ฆ‰ ๋ฐ”์ด๋„ˆ๋ฆฌ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ธฐ๋ณธ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ์–ป๋Š” ๊ฒƒ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๋ฐ”์ด๋„ˆ๋ฆฌ ์ž์ฒด์—์„œ ํ•ต์‹ฌ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ์ถ”์ถœํ•˜๋Š” ๊ณผ.. 2025. 4. 25.
COM(Component Object Model)์˜ ๊ฐœ๋… ์˜ค๋Š˜์€ COM(Component Object Model) ๊ฐœ๋…์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ์•Œ์•„๋ณด๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. โ—‹ COM(Component Object Model) ๊ฐœ๋…Microsoft์—์„œ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœํ•œ ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด ์ปดํฌ๋„ŒํŠธ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์˜ ์ธํ„ฐํŽ˜์ด์Šค ํ‘œ์ค€์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.์ผ๋ฐ˜์ ์œผ๋กœ ํด๋ผ์ด์–ธํŠธ/์„œ๋ฒ„, RPC, ๋ถ„์‚ฐ ๊ฐ์ฒด์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ๋ถ„์‚ฐ ์ปดํ“จํŒ… ๋ชจ๋ธ์—์„œ ์ž‘๋™ํ•˜๋„๋ก ์„ค๊ณ„๋˜์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์–ด๋–ค ์–ธ์–ด๋กœ๋“  COM ๊ฐ์ฒด๋ฅผ ์‰ฝ๊ฒŒ ์ž‘์„ฑํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ณ , ๊ทธ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์„ ์ผ๋ฐ˜ ํ”„๋กœ๊ทธ๋žจ์—์„œ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. โ—‹ COM ๊ตฌ์กฐ์˜ ํ•ต์‹ฌ ์š”์†ŒCOM ๊ฐ์ฒด์‹ค์ œ ๋™์ž‘ํ•˜๋Š” ์ธ์Šคํ„ด์Šค(instance)๋ฅผ ์˜๋ฏธํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.์ตœ์†Œํ•œ IUnknown ์ธํ„ฐํŽ˜์ด์Šค๋ฅผ ๊ตฌํ˜„ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์ปดํฌ๋„ŒํŠธ ๋‹จ์œ„์˜ ๊ฐ์ฒด์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.IUnknown์€ ๋ชจ๋“  COM ์ธํ„ฐํŽ˜์ด์Šค์˜ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์ด ๋˜๋Š” ์ธํ„ฐํŽ˜์ด์Šค์ด๋ฏ€๋กœ COM์˜ ๋ชจ๋“  ๊ฐ์ฒด๊ฐ€ ๋ฐ˜๋“œ์‹œ ๊ตฌํ˜„ํ•ด์•ผ๋˜๋Š”.. 2025. 4. 21.